Philosophy of Mind 论文

1996引用 678
Philosophy and Theoretical ScienceComputability, Logic, AI AlgorithmsClassical Philosophy and Thought

详细信息

发表日期
1996-01-01
发表年份
1996

关键词

Philosophy and Theoretical ScienceComputability, Logic, AI AlgorithmsClassical Philosophy and Thought

摘要

Preface 1. Introduction What Is Philosophy of Mind? Metaphysical Preliminaries Mind-Body Materialism and Physicalism Varieties of Mental Phenomena Is There a Mark of the Mental? For Further Reading Notes 2. Mind as Immaterial Substance: Descartes's Dualism Descartes's Interactionist Substance Dualism Why Minds and Bodies Are Distinct: Some Arguments Princess Elisabeth Against Descartes The Pairing Problem: Another Causal Immaterial Minds in Space? Substance Dualism and Property Dualism For Further Reading Notes 3. Mind and Behavior: Behaviorism The Cartesian Theater and the Beetle in the Box What Is Behavior? Logical Behaviorism: A Positivist A Behavioral Translation of Paul Has a Toothache Difficulties with Behavioral Definitions Do Pains Entail Pain Behavior? Ontological Behaviorism The Real Relationship Between Pain and Pain Behavior Behaviorism in Psychology Why Behavior Matters to Mind For Further Reading Notes 4. Mind as the Brain: The Psychoneural Identity Theory Mind-Brain Correlations Making Sense of Mind-Brain Correlations The from Simplicity Arguments for Psychoneural Identity An from Mental Causation Against Psychoneural Identity Theory Reductive and Nonreductive Physicalism For Further Reading Notes 5. Mind as a Computing Machine: Machine Functionalism Multiple Realizability and the Functional Conception of Mind Functional Properties and Their Realizers: Definitions Functionalism and Behaviorism Turing Machines Physical Realizers of Turing Machines Machine Functionalism: Motivations and Claims Machine Functionalism: Further Issues Can Machines Think? The Turing Test Computationalism and the Chinese Room For Further Reading Notes 6. Mind as a Causal System: Causal-Theoretical Functionalism The Ramsey-Lewis Method Choosing an Underlying Psychology Functionalism as Physicalism: Psychological Reality Objections and Difficulties Roles Versus Realizers: The Status of Cognitive Science For Further Reading Notes 7. Mental Causation Agency and Mental Causation Mental Causation, Mental Realism, and Epiphenomenalism Psychophysical Laws and Is Anomalous Monism a Form of Epiphenomenalism? Counterfactuals to the Rescue? Physical Causal Closure and the Exclusion Argument The Supervenience Argument and Epiphenomenalism Further Issues: The Extrinsicness of Mental States For Further Reading Notes 8. Mental Content Interpretation Theory The Causal-Correlational Approach: Informational Semantics Misrepresentation and the Teleological Approach Narrow Content and Wide Content: Content Externalism The Metaphysics of Wide Content States Is Narrow Content Possible? Two Problems for Content Externalism For Further Reading Notes 9. What Is Consciousness? Some Views on Consciousness Nagel and His Inscrutable Bats Phenomenal Consciousness and Access Consciousness Consciousness and Subjectivity Does Consciousness Involve Higher-Order Perception or Thought? Transparency of Experience and Qualia Representationalism For Further Reading Notes 10. Consciousness and the Mind-Body The Explanatory Gap and the Hard Problem Does Consciousness Supervene on Physical Properties? Closing the Gap: Reduction and Reductive Explanation Functional Analysis and Reductive Explanation Consciousness and Brain Science What Mary, the Super Vision Scientist, Didn't Know The Limits of Physicalism For Further Reading Notes References Index

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